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  Abstract: 
The theory of transformation pressure sheds light on the importance of negative driving 
forces for economic growth and the countercyclical movement in innovations and 
productivity growth. The theory suggests that firms have a status quo bias in periods of 
increasing profits leading to lower productivity growth. Firm agents are governed by 
changes in current profits through historical relativism, the peak end rule and 
overconfidence. They will first abandon a status quo bias after an actual decline in profits 
though both under  and overreaction is possible. On the other hand Schumpeterian 
economics stress that firm renewal is speeded up during recoveries, e.g. by psychological 
reasons. The two contradicting hypotheses were tested by a role play where a group of 
university students in economics completed a questionnaire acting as managers for an 
established company. The students had the opportunity to choose between different 
growth strategies and define the underlying psychological mechanism. The questionnaire 
also provided room for rational considerations. The role play confirmed the theory of 
transformation pressure more than Schumpeterian economics but primarily that the 
students expected that they would have reacted rationally as managers.  
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1. Introduction 
Today economists use psychological concepts such as present biased 
preferences (hyperbolic discounting), overconfidence, overreaction, anchoring 
effects, herd behavior and loss aversion in the analysis of consumption patterns, 
household saving, labor market behavior and financial investments. Furthermore, 
game theorists and experimentalists focus on the psychology of strategy choices 
and investment decisions. But the analysis of industrial renewal and the business 
cycle has largely been untouched by the growing concern for psychology in 
economics.
1 In many respects the psychology of financial agents is also the 
psychology of firms in the non financial business sector. 
 
In the 1990s a combined psychological and structural theory of transformation 
pressure was developed in Sweden at the initiative of a productivity commission 
blaming devaluations for the country’s poor productivity performance in the 
previous decade (Swedish Productivity Commission, 1992). The commission 
maintained that the associated profit increase in the exposed sector, 
notwithstanding its temporary character, delayed structural change and the 
firms’ use of production slacks and introduction of new products, technologies 
and organizations. Accordingly the theory of transformation pressure (henceforth 
TTP) came to emphasize that productivity growth is hampered by high current 
profits (Erixon, 2007).  
 
                                                 
1 There are some exceptions, see for example, Jaimorich and Rebelo (2007).   3 
The aim of this paper is to present the hypotheses and underlying psychological 
mechanisms in the TTP. The theory sheds light on the importance of negative 
driving forces for macroeconomic developments and, therefore, on the 
countercyclical movement of innovations and productivity (growth). A further aim 
of this paper is to compare the psychology of the TTP with that of 
Schumpeterian economics. In the analysis of the business cycle and of economic 
progress Schumpeterian economists stress the importance of positive driving 
forces for innovations and productivity. New technical opportunities, learning and 
spillover effects, scale advantages and large financial endowments (especially for 
R&D investments) will lead to firm renewal, procyclical innovations and 
productivity growth and to virtuous growth circles in the economy. The positive 
driving forces are also psychological in Schumpeterian economics. For example, 
some Schumpeterian economists maintain that decision makers in the firms 
become more optimistic and risk prone in a recovery leading to higher R&D 
investments.  
 
This paper also presents the results from an experimental role play testing the 
validity of the TTP and the Schumpeterian theories under review. The role play 
was also designed to provide room for rational motifs. The game was played by 
85 students in economics at Stockholm University. The students were asked to 
make decisions on investment and growth strategies by acting as leaders of an   4 
established company. They were also asked to describe their own view of the 
underlying psychological mechanisms.  
 
This paper will not scrutinize the structural and institutional preconditions for firm 
behavior in the TTP. Neither is the focus on the ‘structural’ hypothesis in the TTP 
(and also in Schumpeterian economics) that high profits will delay the elimination 
of inefficient firms (and plants) and the phasing out of stagnating industries 
having a negative effect on aggregate productivity growth. We will also disregard 
in this paper the productivity performance of new firms. Our focus on the 
productivity development of established firms is legitimized by empirical studies 
demonstrating the decisive role of ‘within firm’ effects (in contrast to changes in 
the composition of plants and firms) for productivity changes on the aggregate 
level (see World Bank, 2008, ch. 3). Furthermore the paper will only pay 
attention to the behavior of established firms in periods of increasing profits and 
the reaction by these firms to a sudden decline in actual profits. Thus, in terms 
of the business cycle, the paper will consider the behavior of established 
companies in the recovery phase and at the upper turning point. The business 
cycle perspective in this paper hides that the TTP is basically a theory of 
economic growth. Permanent negative shocks are expected in this theory to 
foster more innovations in the long run and, as temporary negative shocks,   5 
irreversible changes in industrial composition, for example, by stopping path 
depending industrial processes with a limited productivity potential.
2 
 
2. Basic notions and hypotheses in the theory of transformation 
pressure 
The central idea in the TTP that productivity is enhanced by falling profits is not 
new. Theories of bounded rationality envisage the growth enhancing effects of 
negative driving forces. They suggest, as the TTP, that deviations from profit 
maximization are smaller if firms are put under external pressure. In his theory 
of X inefficiencies Harvey Leibenstein postulated a positive relationship between 
competitive conditions and productivity through variations in managerial effort. 
The literature on X inefficiencies focuses on the use of production slacks 
(rationalization). But Leibenstein and others have also considered the possibility 
that external pressure would augment the use, and even development, of new 
technologies (Leibenstein, 1980, 39, 46, 234 236).  
 
There are, however, some unique features of the TTP in relation to the theory of 
X inefficiencies. First, when analyzing enforced changes in productivity, the TTP 
abandons the principal agent perspective in the X inefficiency literature. The 
theory posits that both managers and owners are influenced by the mental 
                                                 
2 In this paper we will also exclude the argument in the TTP that falling profits will stimulate the 
creativity and skill of firm agents – necessity is the mother of invention (see Erixon, 2007, pp. 
338 339). We will also ignore the time pressure aspect of the TTP in (Erixon, 2007). 
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processes leading to a negative relationship between profits and productivity 
(growth). Besides, the TTP assumes that rational managers have always 
incentives to maximize profits of the firm where they are currently employed.
3 To 
meet inevitable challenges in the future firms must also in good times (even with 
incomplete knowledge about the scope and nature of the threats) introduce new 
technologies and products and facilitate the financing of new investments by 
becoming more efficient. Selfish managers will take these steps if their prestige, 
career and expected incomes in the business sector are closely related to the 
profit development and survival of the firm where they are employed at the 
moment. Furthermore, in the TTP, both managers and owners may give priority 
to the survival of the firm if there is a trade off between this goal and profit 
maximization. 
 
Second, in the TTP, stronger effort by managers (and owners) is not the only 
explanations for why harder external pressure on firms leads to higher 
productivity. Productivity can increase in the firms if decision makers simply 
abandon their too confident view of their current growth strategy and abilities. 
Third, the TTP stresses that firms will only react to actual reductions in profits. 
                                                 
3 The notion of rationality has a general and specific content in this paper. In the specific case, rationality is 
defined in terms of (expected) utility and profit maximization (given information costs) and the underlying 
axioms or in terms of Bayes’s rule. In the general (firm) case, rationality is seen as a deliberate activity to 
increase knowledge about possible investment options and their outcomes (including the probability of 
different outcomes in the future). The calculation of expected profits can be based on retrospective analyses 
of historical outcomes. The general notion of rationality also includes activities to increase knowledge 
about the working of existing technologies and markets (see learning-by-doing) provided that these 
activities are intentional. 
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The distinction between expected and actual changes in profits is not crucial in 
the theory of X inefficiencies. The latter theory does not preclude that managers 
must and will react to forthcoming threats to the firm, threats that are inevitable 
in a market economy (cf. Hermalin, 1992). In contrast, the TTP suggests that 
firms will first respond when the profit decline is manifest or almost certain. An 
actual decline in profits will enforce the firms to become more rational. Agents 
will then e.g. start to collect and process information about possible external 
threats and alternative growth strategies. They will also meet an actual fall in 
profits by launching productivity enhancing programs, possibly by switching to a 
new growth strategy. 
 
Fourth, the TTP takes a further step in relation to the theory of X inefficiencies 
by assuming that firms will only react to recent changes in profits. The 
assumption that firms are governed by current changes in profits builds a bridge 
between macroeconomics and central notions of heuristic behavior in 
psychology. It will thereby reestablish the psychological aspects of X 
inefficiencies that were elaborated by Leibenstein but largely obscured by other 
economists (see Leibenstein, 1979, pp. 484 485 and 1985, pp. 6 7). By the 
assumption that expectations of firm agents are based on current outcomes, 
thus not on outcomes in the past, the TTP also departs from the rational 
expectation theory of adaptive learning and the option theory of investment 
under risk. In these theories expectations of economic agents are based on   8 
actual observations during a long period making it possible to separate between 
stochastic and systematic changes in prices and profits (Lucas, 1986, S414 416; 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In the TTP, a current decline in profits will enforce firm 
agents to become more rational – they will e.g. make effort to disentangle the 
origin of the profit fall. In the rational theories of investment under risk and 
adaptive learning a decline in current profits is merely an additional source of 
information for rational firm agents continuously making efforts to discriminate 
between temporary and long run profit developments.  
 
The suggested negative relationship between current profits and productivity 
does not depend on any specific assumption about uncertainty and risk. In the 
TTP, companies will postpone measures to increase productivity until the day of 
a decrease in current profits also in the case of large uncertainties. In this case 
firms cannot gain reliable information about external challenges by waiting. But 
rational firms would have considered alternatives to their chosen investment 
strategy and taken precautions to increase flexibility in production and marketing 
already before an actual decline in profits. The TTP posits that firm actors will 
first look for a large number of investment opportunities and make the technical 
and organizational arrangements needed to increase the firm’s adjustment 
capacity at the time of an actual fall in profits. In the cases where the future is 
relatively easy to predict firms are supposed not to search for available 
information until the day of an actual decline in profits.    9 
 
However, notwithstanding the assumption that a decline in current profits makes 
firms more rational, the TTP provides room for both under  and overreaction. 
Firm agents may underreact through the lingering impact of psychological 
distortions. They can also overreact by introducing extensive measures to 
increase productivity after a profit decline that is modest, temporary and 
basically not a threat to the firm’s existence. The TTP does not preclude that 
overreaction (or underreaction) reflects the lack of reliable information. But it 
emphasizes that agents will incorrectly confuse an actual profit decline with 
harder transformation pressure by psychological reasons. 
 
Transformation pressure is defined in this paper as a change in external 
circumstances for firms leading to a sustainable decline in profits and eventually 
to firm closure unless steps are taken to increase productivity. Established firms 
may face harder transformation pressure through (permanent) negative demand 
and supply shocks. Price reductions or the introduction of new products (and 
product differentiation) by competitors (new or established) is an example of an 
asymmetric demand shock for an individual firm. An established firm may also be 
indirectly hit by harder competitive pressure through endogenous increases in 
nominal wages, interest rates and material prices. For example, wage bidding by 
expansive firms to attract labor will increase wages for indispensable labor in 
other firms. It is true that the expansion by dynamic firms may benefit other   10 
firms through production and innovation linkages or positive effects on aggregate 
demand. However this paper will not pinpoint the demand and knowledge 
spillover effects of decisions on the firm level. It focuses on the profit reducing 
effects of stronger external pressure.  
 
A profit change is associated in this paper with a change in the external 
circumstances for the firms. However, we do not exclude the possibility that firm 
agents believe that changes in profits reflect internal conditions. For example, 
actors may make the mistake to attribute a general profit increase to their own 
(superior) capabilities. In the TTP, the subsequent decline in actual profits will 
initiate effort to distinguish the origin of this decline, but also of the previous 
profit recovery.  
 
Furthermore, in this paper we will associate a change in actual profits with a 
shock. This assumption conforms to the case of large uncertainties (excluding 
the possibility that agents would provide reliable information be waiting) and also 
to that of self deception. In the latter case, changes in external circumstances 
are unexpected for firm agents who (cheaply) could have gained reliable 
information about expected profits (possibly about the probability of different 
outcomes) if they had really searched. External events come as a shock for 
agents who under the spell of misleading psychological forces (intoxication, 
haughtiness and repression) have ignored available relevant information.    11 
 
We will assume throughout the paper that firms make a choice between three 
growth strategies that are assumed to be mutually exclusive. The first strategy is 
a pure status quo option without any changes in technologies, product 
composition or organizations whatsoever. Investments are only made to increase 
production capacity or substitute labor. There is not even room here for 
rationalization, i.e. for the use of production slacks in the firms. Thus, this 
strategy is not connected with any increase in total factor productivity. The 
second growth strategy represents a status quo oriented transformation. Firms 
will increase total factor productivity by rationalization or by marginal changes in 
technologies, product composition and organizations. The third growth strategy 
is a radical transformation constituted by major changes in technologies, product 
structures or organizations. This strategy is assumed to have a larger growth 
potential in terms of total factor productivity than a transformation along a 
status quo strategy, both for the firm itself and for society at large. 
 
The TTP maintains that firms have a tendency to opt for a status quo oriented 
strategy in periods of increasing actual profits. This view on firm behavior does 
not exclude that status quo oriented firms spend resources in good times on 
marginal changes of technologies, product compositions and organizations or on 
rationalization. But the TTP suggests that short run increases in actual profits are 
unfavorable to radical transformation. Furthermore it presupposes that firms in   12 
good times will take fewer measures in general to increase total factor 
productivity. Thus low total factor productivity growth within firms in a recovery 
reflects that decision makers will then not only resist radical transformation but 
also take limited steps to increase productivity by status quo oriented measures.  
 
According to a special case of the TTP firms are particularly anxious to avoid 
radical transformation if short run profits increase to record levels. In this case, 
an even smaller number of firms are assumed to choose radical transformation in 
comparison to the case of a general boost in profits. Moreover, when profits soar 
to record levels, firms that would have chosen a status quo oriented 
transformation during a ‘normal’ profit increase are expected to follow a strategy 
without any transformation at all. The TTP further assumes that total factor 
productivity growth in the firms will be particularly low if a recovery turns into a 
profit boom. 
 
In the TTP firm actors will first take substantial measures to increase total factor 
productivity and engage in transformation activities after a sudden decrease in 
actual profits. The TTP does not specify whether firms that had chosen a status 
quo strategy without transformation in the previous period will meet a profit 
decline by transformation along the lines of a status quo or a radical strategy. 
But the theory asserts that firms that have opted for a status quo based   13 
transformation in the period of increasing profits will switch to radical 
transformation in the subsequent period of dwindling profits.  
 
The distinction between a ‘normal’ profit increase and a profit boom is also 
crucial in the TTP where the reaction to a profit decline is concerned.  According 
to a specific version of the theory firms react faster by transformation to a 
decline in profits if the decline was preceded by a profit boom. Firms that only 
chose a status quo option without transformation or a status quo oriented 
transformation (instead of a radical transformation) when profits reached record 
levels are supposed to react immediately to a profit decline by transformation 
and radical transformation respectively. This specific TTP maintains that more 
firms are involved in transformation activities after a small decrease in profits if 
they have previously experienced a profit boom. The theory also suggests that 
total factor productivity growth in the recession will be higher if a given profit 
decline was preceded by a profit boom.  
 
The TTP focuses on strategy choices and actions by firms to enhance 
productivity, not on investments per se. The theory does not exclude that harder 
external circumstances will stimulate investments, especially in R&D. Agents may 
have the survival of the firm as a superior goal permitting even negative net 
present values of investments. They may also be convinced that the firm has the 
necessary competencies to meet external challenges. But investments are likely   14 
to be stimulated by the psychology of a status quo bias in periods of increasing 
profits.  Accordingly, investments will probably be impeded by psychological 
factors in periods of an actual decline in profits. We will assume in this paper 
that physical investments, and also total investments, by firms will increase 
(decrease) under easier (hasher) external circumstances. Thus the psychological 
mechanisms favoring a status quo strategy in good times are also supposed to 
reinforce a procyclical investment pattern.  
 
3. The psychology of the theory of transformation pressure 
3.1 A status quo bias in recoveries 
It is hardly controversial to claim that the expectations of economic agents are 
formed by actual outcomes when future is uncertain. It is more controversial to 
maintain a special case of adaptive expectations   people are only governed by 
current outcomes. A sensible argument is that people make heuristic rather than 
rational decisions. Daniel Kahneman’s peak end rule states that people’s 
evaluation of earlier experiences is based on two observations only, the last and 
the exceptional one (see Kahneman, 2003 and Doe and Wolford, 2008). The rule 
suggests that current profits have a strong impact on firms’ investment and 
strategy decisions. Besides, high current profits will probably extend the use of 
heuristic decision making principles per se (cf. the X inefficiency theory).
4 But the 
                                                 
4 By rejecting the propositions that more of a pleasant experience is always better and more of 
an unpleasant experience is always worse the peak end rule breaks with the axiom of dominance 
in the utility maximization model. For example, firms governed by the peak end rule will not   15 
peak end rule provides room for the possibility that firms are affected by 
exceptional events, for example a depression, in the past. Furthermore, by 
emphasizing exceptional events, the peak end rule implies that firm decisions are 
particularly sensitive to profits approaching peak or trough levels. Thus, in the 
analysis of investments and strategy choices, the peak end rule legitimates a 
stronger weight to high (and low) current profits.  
 
The heuristic principle of the irrelevance of history (historical relativism) 
underlines that only current outcomes matter.
5 Firm agents may argue that profit 
outcomes in the past reflected specific circumstances that are not prevailing 
anymore. Thus, agents believe that they have nothing to learn from history. A 
reasonable assumption is that historical relativism is strengthened if the period of 
increasing profit will last over a couple of years or if it ends with a profit boom. 
The belief that history cannot provide any guidelines for investments and 
strategy decisions today may of course be correct. But historical relativism often 
reflects that people tend to explain their behavior by referring to controlled 
processes (calculation) and not to automatic and affective forces (see Camerer et 
al., 2005, pp. 37 38). The peak end rule, historical relativism and other heuristic 
principles can be seen as (mostly unconscious) strategies to free people from 
                                                                                                                                                 
consider a profitable investment (positive marginal profits) as an improvement if connected with 
a decrease in actual (average) profits.  
 
5 See Shiller (2001). Robert Shiller relates the phenomenon of the irrelevance of history in 
financial markets to the heuristic principle of anchoring effects – speculators use recent outcomes 
as an anchor (Shiller, 2001, p. 1326). 
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time consuming and unpleasant calculation activities (see Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974, 1986 and Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). Specifically, the 
peak end rule and historical relativism reflect either a limited cognitive capacity 
(e.g., memory capacity) or an emotional state that can be characterized as a 
propensity to live in the present.  
 
In the TTP, firm agents governed by historical determinism and the peak end 
rule will overreact to an increase in current profits. These agents will also 
overreact to a profit increase by overconfidence. More exactly, a short run 
increase in profits is supposed to create or strengthen an overconfident attitude 
among firm agents.
6 Psychologists claim that overconfidence is common and will 
not be corrected by learning or even by experts when predictability is low as in 
the case of stock prices and also of profits in the non financial business sector 
(Rabin, 1998, pp. 31 32; Nelson et al., 2001, 172 190; Önkal et al, 2003, pp. 
182 183; Hilton, 2003, pp. 274 285, 289 291).
7  
 
                                                 
6 Higher profits make actors (more) overconfident both directly, provided that current outcomes 
matter, and indirectly through the extended use of heuristic decision rules focusing on current 
outcomes. 
 
7 The proposition that an increase in short run profits leads to overconfidence is possibly 
supported by evidence that people are too confident in a small number of observations with 
unambiguous outcomes. Economists, statisticians and psychologists alike often emphasize that 
people’s estimation of probabilities is too governed by the exceptional outcomes of small samples 
(see, for example,Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 and 1986 and Nelson et al., 2001). According to 
a Bayesian observer people pay too much attention to the strength of evidence at the expense of 
the weight of evidence (the statistical reliability). However, this literature provides no explanation 
of why, for example, firm agents are focusing on current outcomes only.   17 
Overconfidence is mostly defined, both in economics and psychology, by 
reference to Bayesian statistics. However, the difficulties to define true 
probabilities of different outcomes when the future is genuinely uncertain compel 
us to define overconfidence (and underconfidence) in terms of a specific mental 
state. In this perspective overconfidence may characterize, but is conceptually 
unrelated to, a certain choice or opinion.  
 
We will define three types of overconfidence in connection with an increase in 
current profits. The first type emphasizes that firm agents will be intoxicated by 
success and therefore lose their sense of proportions when evaluating the profit 
potential (and risks) of a certain growth strategy or of the firm itself. Thus 
feelings of success will distort the calculations of expected profits. Decision 
makers may be convinced that they are actors in a ‘new’ economy immune to 
recessions and crises. The second type of overconfidence after a profit increase 
is the result of haughtiness. A temporary profit boost may create an exaggerated 
belief among firm agents in their own superiority and invulnerability. For example 
managers become too confident in their capacity, or in the ability of principles 
and peers, to achieve the firm’s profit potential and ward off challenges to the 
firm in the future. They may also automatically credit themselves (or their 
colleagues) for a profit increase that was actually caused by an external demand 
shock or an expansionary economic policy. The third form of overconfidence 
after an increase in current profits is developed through repression, thus   18 
overconfidence is described in psycho analytical terms. The profit increase may 
induce firm actors to put information contradicting their current investments and 
growth strategies in a subconscious mental department (cf. Tuckett, 2009, pp. 4 
6). They will e.g. hide the potential risks of large losses and even of bankruptcy 
in their subconscious mind. Decision makers will suppress their fears of being too 
risk prone and possibly also of being too emotional in their evaluation of 
expected profits and their own capabilities. Thus repression can be seen not only 
as an additional source of overconfidence but also as a necessary condition for 
the judgment fallacies and self overrating attitudes associated with the two other 
forms of overconfidence. 
 
In the TTP firms’ focus on current outcomes and overconfidence because of 
higher profits in the short run will lead to overinvestments (cf. Charness and 
Levin, 2005, pp. 1304 1308). But more important, the TTP suggests that these 
overinvestments will favor a status quo oriented growth strategy.
8 Thus, decision 
makers in firms experiencing a profit recovery will largely ignore future threats to 
a status quo strategy and also information about outcomes in the past that are 
critical to this strategy. Furthermore agents will then disregard that the firm 
might have been radically transformed on several occasions in the past. The TTP 
also posits that a recent increase in profits will induce firm actors to make less 
                                                 
8 What is more, in the TTP, the extended use of heuristic rules in periods of increasing profits will 
strengthen the preference for a status quo alternative. The stronger priority by firm agents to 
current outcomes (see historical relativism and the peak end rule) will e.g. reinforce an 
overconfident attitude to status quo among firm actors.   19 
effort to enhance productivity notwithstanding the possible choice of a status 
quo oriented transformation.  
 
In the TTP the status quo bias may be particularly strong if firms are 
experiencing exceptionally high profits. Firm agents following the peak end rule 
put strong weight on record high profits strengthening a status quo bias in the 
TTP. What is more, the adherence to the peak end rule per se and historical 
thinking may be exceptionally strong (as therefore the status quo bias) in a profit 
boom. Overconfidence may also be particularly strong in a profit boom (in terms 
of Bayes’s rule or a mental diagnosis) regardless of the extended use of heuristic 
decision rules focusing on current outcomes.  
 
The psychological literature supports a hypothesis about a fundamental status 
quo bias (see e.g. Karlsson et al., 2002 and Verplanken and Orbell, 2003). Some 
psychologists refer to people’s priority to alternatives whose probabilities of 
outcomes can be estimated with certainty (ambiguity aversion); firms may have 
more knowledge about the probabilities of possible outcomes with a status quo 
strategy than with other strategies. Furthermore, people may prefer a status quo 
option with a sure but modest gain to avoid the disappointment of a large loss if 
they instead had chosen a risky alternative (see the regret theory). Firms may 
also be stuck to a safe status quo option if they are risk averse and especially if 
they are loss averse, that is opponents of even a small loss (see the prospect   20 
theory).
9 But the outcomes of a status quo strategy are often difficult to predict 
and the choice of this strategy may be a risky venture. For example, static 
producers on monopoly markets face an obvious risk of product innovations by 
new firms. Thus there must be other arguments than predictability and safety for 
a status quo tendency among firm actors.  
 
A status quo bias may reflect hyperbolic discounting.  Firm actors might hesitate 
to pursue a transformation associated with a positive net present value if they 
are overwhelmed by the short term sacrifices and displeasures when 
approaching the day of action.
10 The psychological literature also posits that the 
preference for status quo can emanate from habitual behavior. Habits are 
possibly developed through repetitive behavior, but they can be seen as a 
specific mental state (Verplanken and Orbell, 2003) or as a propensity to adapt 
in a particular way in a particular class of situations (Hodgson, 2004). In both 
perspectives people’s choice of status quo is not necessarily irrational. For 
example, firms might have developed industry specific competences on the basis 
of learning by doing. But the choice of the status quo on habitual grounds may 
reflect the use of heuristic decision rules or pure conservatism. In these cases 
                                                 
9 Examples of ambiguity aversion and minimization of regret challenge the axiom of cancellation 
(independency). Furthermore loss aversion (through framing effects) in the prospect theory 
challenges the axiom of invariance in the utility maximization model. 
 
10 Hyperbolic discounting challenges the axiom of time consistent preferences in the 
maximization utility model (see, for example, O’Donogue and Rabin, 1999 and Angeletos et al., 
2001). 
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repetition has molded a psychological state where a resistance to change is 
automatic and emotional, i.e. not the result of intentional calculation free from 
strong passions. 
 
A status quo bias can also be explained by indecisiveness. A postponement of 
transformation and also of investments per se to attain more information may be 
rational (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). However, to meet inevitable threats in the 
future, firms should eventually, notwithstanding the lack of complete knowledge 
about the extent and nature of possible challenges (and their probabilities), 
abandon a status quo position. Keynes referred to Buridan’s ass. The animal 
starved to death since it was unable to make a choice between two stacks of hay 
on ‘rational’ grounds. Keynes maintained that people must, and will indeed, 
make decisions despite a low weight of evidence, decisions that are based on 
habit, instinct and affection (Keynes, 1979 [1938], p. 294), see also Keynes, 
1936, pp. 161 163). By referring to habits, Keynes provided arguments for a 
status quo bias in investment decisions. But indecisiveness per se can explain 
why firms have a tendency to make investments along the lines of a status quo 
preserving strategy. Indecisiveness may reflect a major affective deficit in 
rational calculation (Camerer et al., 2005, p. 29) or a stalemate between parallel 
mental processes (Spiegler, 2008, p. 518). 
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The TTP supports the idea in the psychological literature that people have a 
confirmatory bias (myside bias). They will collect, process and interpret 
information in a way that confirms an initial choice or opinion. People (including 
experts) are often too confident in their initial option in the eyes of a Bayesian 
statistical observer. They will overreact to information verifying the chosen 
alternative and underreact to data rejecting it. A few observations on profits may 
lead to overconfidence among firm agents in a chosen strategy given a 
confirmatory bias (cf. Rabin and Schrag, 1999; Suen, 2004; Stanovich and West, 
2006). The TTP assumes that a status quo bias is fundamental for a confirmatory 
bias. But it also claims that a preference for status quo might actually have been 
created by an increase in profits in the short run. Furthermore the theory of 
transformation pressure maintains that even a weak signal, for example a profit 




3.2 Abandoning the status quo in a recession 
A sudden decrease in actual profits may mitigate and even remove a status quo 
bias based on people’s aversion to ambiguity, regret and losses. A status quo 
option was not as predictable or free from unfavorable outcomes as the firm 
                                                 
11 Rabin and Schrag (1999) emphasizes that overconfidence can be long lived and even 
strengthened over time if agents are subject to serious confirmatory bias or if the signals 
(information) are ambiguous (given a confirmatory bias). Thus this approach takes a 
confirmatory bias for given. Furthermore it does not discriminate between information about 
actual and expected outcomes. Finally, in Rabin and Schrag’s model, a weak signal is not 
enough, as in the TTP, to induce agents to change opinion or strategy.  
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agents had expected. Furthermore, a profit decline will probably weaken the 
support to a status quo strategy given a confirmatory bias, thus overconfidence 
in this strategy is reduced in light of Bayesian statistics. But the TTP emphasizes 
that a profit decline will reduce actor loyalty to status quo by impelling them to 
become more rational. Agents will e.g. meet an actual fall in profits by making 
stronger effort to foresee future challenges and more systematic studies of 
profits in the past. A decrease in profits after a period with a steady increase in 
profits may serve as an alarm clock for firm agents fearing a substantial 
reduction in profits and also that the survival of the firm is at stake.  
 
There are three aspects on the increase in rational behavior after a reduction in 
current profits. First, a profit fall may cure indecisiveness and weaken a present 
biased preference among decision makers. Second, it may reduce the influence 
of heuristic decision making principles and conservative thinking. Thus the 
support to status quo will no longer, or to lesser degree, be based on (bad) 
habits, the peak end rule and historical relativism. Third, a profit fall may weaken 
or eliminate the overconfidence favoring a status quo option in the TTP. Firm 
agents will then take a more sober view of the firms’ prospect in the future and 
cease to overestimate their competence and invulnerability. Overconfidence can 
also disappear after a decline in actual profits uncovering those doubts about 
investments, growth strategies and personal capabilities that firm agents had put 
in a subconscious mental department during the previous recovery.   24 
 
Thus, the TTP maintains that firm agents become (more) rational after an actual 
decline in profits and that the associated weakening or disappearance of present 
biased preferences, indecisiveness, overconfidence and heuristic behavior will 
reduce the support to a status quo option. (It is possible that more rational 
actors would still prefer a status quo option.) However, the TTP comprises the 
possibility that firm actors will underreact to an actual decline in profits. The 
profit fall may not be strong enough to eliminate overconfidence in the eyes of a 
Bayesian observer (see Rabin and Schrag, 1999) or in terms of a mental 
distortion (intoxication, haughtiness or repression). What is more, firms may 
perhaps have to face a substantial or long lasting external challenge to combat 
the destructive forces of bad habits, indecisiveness and present biased 
preferences. However, in the TTP, the departure from status quo after a decline 
in actual profits can reflect that agents are overreacting (cf. Massey and Wu, 
2005). Managers and owners still governed by the peak end rule and historical 
relativism are too anxious to quit a status quo position after a profit fall. For 
example, they will confuse a (temporary) recession with a long run challenge to 
the firm. A profit decline may also change the attitudes to status quo from 
overconfidence to underconfidence. Agents who earlier had been self deceptive 
about their own judgments and capabilities will not become more sober and self 
knowing but instead be seized with panic and feelings of inferiority (suffering 
from lower self esteem) leading to too weak confidence in ‘business as usual’.    25 
 
A special version of the TTP states that firms react quicker to a profit decline by 
abandoning a status quo alternative if profits have previously approached record 
levels. First, firms that will only chose a status quo alternative in a profit boom 
have probably a weaker confirmatory bias than other firms. Accordingly the 
share of firms with relatively weak confirmatory bias towards the status quo is 
larger in a boom. Second, exceptionally strong confidence in status quo through 
intoxication, haughtiness and repression during a profit boom may turn to its 
opposite in the following recession. Furthermore firms’ overreaction to a 
decrease in profits may be exceptionally strong after a profit boom through the 
lingering influence of pronounced ahistorical thinking. It may be argued that 
firms in general are more overconfident about a status quo option after a profit 
boom (according to either Bayes’s rule or a mental diagnosis) resulting in serious 
underreaction to a fall in actual profits. The TTP does not exclude that firms 
must experience a strong decline in profits to abandon a status quo option (with 
or without transformation) if they had already made this choice before the profit 
recovery had turned to a profit boom. However, the tendency to underreaction is 
not supposed to be strong enough to challenge the conclusion that firms will 
generally react more strongly by transformation if a profit decline was preceded 
by a profit boom.  
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4. The psychology of Schumpeterian economics 
There are some similarities between the TTP and Schumpeter’s theory of the 
business cycle. Schumpeter provided room for overinvestments (malinvestments) 
through overconfidence. In prosperity established firms expect that the price 
increases elicited by the expansion of innovative firms (entrepreneurs) will 
continue (Schumpeter, 1939, pp. 140, 146, 148). But when an innovation cycle 
comes to an end prices will cease to increase changing the mood of firm agents 
from overconfidence to underconfidence (notions that were not used by 
Schumpeter). Furthermore, Schumpeter suggested that the expansion of 
established firms in the prosperity phase will favor a status quo oriented growth 
strategy – ‘business will borrow merely to expand on old lines’ (Schumpeter, 
1939, p. 144). Finally, in both the TTP and Schumpeter’s theory, some firms are 
hit by ‘creative destruction’ due to innovations by other firms leading to 
(external) structural change (Schumpeter, 1976 [1943], pp. 83 84). 
 
Yet there are differences between Schumpeter’s theory of the business cycle and 
the corresponding TTP. In Schumpeter’s Business Cycles, the prosperity phase is 
formed by the innovations by new firms even if these innovations can be spread 
in the recession or depression. It is true that innovations are basically exogenous 
(determined by sociological factors) in Business Cycles. But in his analysis of 
innovation clusters in prosperity Schumpeter shed light on positive driving forces, 
mainly new technological opportunities. Furthermore Schumpeter emphasized in   27 
Business Cycles that the recession/depression will not lay the ground for the 
following revival and prosperity by enforcing innovations or productivity changes 
in the firms.
12 On the contrary, reductions in production costs and interest rates, 
thus positive driving forces, might lead the economy out of a depression 
(Schumpeter, 1939, 139 n1, 152, 154). By underlying the importance of R&D 
investments under big business conditions Schumpeter focused even more on 
positive driving forces in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy though he 
underlined here the long run perspective and stability rather than the scale and 
financial advantages of large companies (Schumpeter (1976 [1943], pp. 101 
103). Schumpeter used the notion of creative destruction in Capitalism, Socialism 




The growth enhancing role of positive driving forces, primarily financial factors 
and scale advantages in R&D, is underlined in the neo Schumpeterian 
literature.
14 In the Nelson Winter model of virtuous growth circles initial 
                                                 
12 Schumpeter (1939, pp. 139, 143, 150, 155). 
 
13 In fact Schumpeter emphasized that frequent bankruptcies under competitive conditions would, 
by intensifying irregularities and disequilibrium tendencies, have a negative effect on innovations 
(Schumpeter, 1976 [1943], pp. 90 91, 95 and 104 105). 
 
14 In their industrial analysis neo Schumpeterian economists first emphasized that strong 
competitive pressure would hamper the profit incentives and financial opportunities to make R&D 
investments and the possibilities to exploit scale advantages in R&D (see Scherer and Ross, 
1990, pp. 637, 643 and Scherer, 1992, p. 1420). Even today many neo Schumpeterian 
economists conform to Schumpeter’s view by considering innovations as exogenous or by 
emphasizing the importance of positive driving forces (favorable financial conditions, learning 
effects, knowledge spillover effects, etc.) and the consequences of innovations for structural 
change and economic growth (see Hanusch and Pyka, 2007).   28 
innovation profits will lead to new innovations by facilitating R&D spending. The 
importance of positive driving forces is accentuated on the macroeconomic level 
by the assumption that innovations by leading firms are gradually imitated by 
other firms (see Nelson and Winter, 1978, pp. 525 541 and Nelson, 1995, pp. 
68 72). Neoclassical (endogenous growth) theorists inspired by Schumpeter’s 
notion of creative destruction have argued that a countercyclical productivity 
pattern could emerge through variations in the elimination of inefficient 
production units and also in R&D investments and the use of production slacks. 
But the tendency to countercyclical R&D investments in these growth theories 
does not reflect any changes in external pressure (through procyclical profits) as 
in the TTP but in resources available for R&D activities. Furthermore, this 
tendency is offset by the procyclical development in firms’ ability to self finance 
R&D investments (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, 239 243; Malley and Muscatelli, 
1999, p. 340; Barlevy, 2004).
15 
 
Neither Schumpeter nor economists in the Schumpeterian tradition have 
emphasized the importance of psychological factors in the analysis of economic 
progress. However we will seize upon that positive driving forces are emphasized 
in the Schumpeterian tradition and that some economists in this tradition actually 
                                                 
 
15 There is, however, a growing support in growth economics to the hypothesis that more intense 
foreign and domestic competition will enhance productivity by putting a stronger pressure on 
firms and industries to be more efficient and innovative (Trindade, 2008). Neoclassical 
economists influenced by Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction have recently referred to 
the positive effects of harder competition (e,g. through entry) on innovations by incumbent firms 
close to the technological frontier (see Aghion et al., 2009).   29 
refer to psychology when distinguishing the factors behind R&D investments and 
industrial renewal. Two Swedish economists heavily influenced by Schumpeter, 
Johan Åkerman and Erik Dahmén, stressed that time perspectives are 
lengthened in a recovery, favoring R&D and other long sighted investments, and 
then shortened in a recession having a negative effect on these investments. 
Åkerman referred to variations in subjective discount rates but primarily to 
overoptimism (overconfidence) and extensive risk taking (by firms and banks) in 
a recovery and to overpessimism and risk aversion in a recession or depression 
(see Åkerman, 1960, 142 143 and Erixon, 2011). 
 
We will attribute two hypotheses to Schumpeterian economics of which one is 
compatible with the TTP – firm agents will be overconfident when profits are 
increasing in the short run leading to overinvestments. The other Schumpeterian 
hypothesis says, in conflict with the TTP (and actually with Schumpeter’s view in 
Business Cycles) that overconfident and risk prone agents will prioritize radical 
transformation in good times. Thus the Schumpeterian theory is satisfied if firms 
would radically transform in periods of increasing actual profits. Accordingly, 
Furthermore, a sudden decline in profits makes agents underconfident and risk 
avert favoring a status quo option without any transformation at all or actions to 
increase productivity along the lines of a status quo strategy. Thus firms that 
have chosen radical transformation in a recovery would follow a status quo 
oriented growth trajectory after an actual fall in profits. Schumpeterian   30 
economics will also be connected with the hypothesis that total factor 
productivity growth within firms moves cyclically by psychological reasons. 
 
5. The experimental role play 
The prime aim of the role play was to examine the validity of the hypotheses 
about investments and strategy choices and the underlying psychological 
mechanisms in the TTP. Some of the alternatives in a choice set were compatible 
with the TTP, other alternatives were not. The role play had also the ambition to 
compare the hypotheses about strategy choices in the TTP with those in 
Schumpeterian economics.  
 
Figure 1 summarizes the chosen strategies in the TTP when the firms are 
experiencing first an increase in profits during a couple of years and then a 
sudden decline in profits.  Figure 2 presents the strategy choices in the special 
cases of the theory; it is possible to draw a decision tree reproducing the choices 
in a profit recovery, profit boom and in the periods of a modest and substantial 
decrease in actual profits (where the previous increase in profits is used as a 












Figure 1:  Strategy choices in the theory of transformation pressure – the 
































1 The TTP does not exclude that some firms choose radical transformation in periods of 
increasing profits or that some firms will hold on to a status quo oriented transformation also in a 
profit boom. 
 
2 A hypothesis that firms that choose the same strategy during a normal increase in profits and in 
a profit boom need a substantial decrease in profits to transform is not a necessary condition in 
the TTP. 
   33 
 
 




The 85 students enrolled in the experimental role play were first year students in 
Economics at Stockholm University. Before the role game the students had 
followed lectures, participated in exercises and conducted an examination on the 
basic IS LM model in macroeconomics. In this model private investments are a 
function of the rate of interest and of GDP (the accelerator). Before the role play 
the students had also had attended lectures on how investments are determined 
outside the basic IS LM model. Private investments are a function here of the 
gross present value   determined primarily by expected profits and interest rates 
  and the investment costs. The present value approach is only theoretically 
exclusive if combined with an assumption of how expectations are formed. For 
example, expectations are basically determined by forward looking agents in the 
theory of rational expectations and by current profits in the TTP.   34 
 
The students were asked to complete an anonymous questionnaire with nine 
questions about their investments and strategy choices under varying external 
circumstances and about the underlying motifs and psychological processes (see 
Appendix). They were instructed, both verbally and in the questionnaire, to use 
their imagination and make endeavors to identify themselves with the manager 
of an established company (a company older than 20 years). The participants in 
the role play were asked not to be governed by their guesses about what they 
were expected to reply according to the macroeconomic textbook or the 
experimentalists. The students should only try to imagine which choices they 
would have made as managers and describe their view of why they acted in the 
way they did. They were not under time pressure when completing the 
questionnaire. They participated in the experiment during a break for twenty 
minutes in the middle of a lecture. 
 
The students should give one answer only to each question. When asked about 
their strategy decisions the participants could choose between a status quo 
strategy without transformation, a status quo option with transformation and a 
radical transformation. The design of the questions about strategies made it 
possible to reproduce a sequential process for each student formed by his or her 
reaction to variations in expected and actual profits. When describing the 
underlying incentives and psychological mechanisms the students could choose   35 
between a large number of options. The formulation of the alternatives was 
based on the psychological explanations in the TTP but also on other 
psychological inferences and on theories about rational behavior.  
 
Attempts were made in the questionnaire to avoid a bias for theories challenging 
the axiom of rational behavior. The set of answers provided large room for the 
propositions of basic (text book) macroeconomics and for rational behavior in 
general. For example, when asked about the effects on investments of an 
increase in profits in the short run, the participants were informed that a similar 
increase in profits for other companies was not excluded. In the theory of 
rational expectations firms will not expand if they know that the increase in 
profits is general. In fact, the provision of the ‘correct’ text book answers and of 
information favoring theories of rational behavior and the obvious risk that the 
participants would act more rational in fantasy than in reality suggest that our 
role play had a rational bias. In fact, the questionnaire was consciously framed to 
reduce the risk of a bias of an opposite type. However our panel approach made 
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6. The questionnaire 
6.1 Question 1 
The students acting as managers for an established company were asked to 
reveal their investment decisions in a situation with increasing actual profits (the 
rate of return on equity) in the short run, thus during this year and the previous 
two three years. One of alternatives confirmed the TTP and the Schumpeterian 
theories  – a previous increase in profits will stimulate investments by having a 
positive effect on expectations of future profits (alternative a).  
 
Other alternatives were compatible with the basic macroeconomic model (the 
accelerator, alternative b) and with a general version of the rational theory of 
forwards looking expectations (alternative f). Two alternatives were meant to 
cover specific versions of the theory of forward looking expectations   firms will 
increase investments after an increase in actual profits by expectations of harder 
competitive pressure (alternative c) or of higher demand (alternative d), see the 
possibility that other companies, including competitors, could have experienced a 
similar increase in profits. Furthermore, the students had the opportunity to 
select answers in accordance with the rational theories of adaptive learning and 
investment under uncertainty (alternative e and g). In these theories 
investments will not necessary be stimulated by higher profits during a couple of 
years   investments are a function of profits during a long historical period or 
postponed to distinguish whether the profit increase is temporary or sustainable.    37 
 
6.2 Question 2 
The second question was only directed to students who had replied that 
increasing profits in the short run, by having a positive effect on expectations, 
made them inclined to increase investments (see Question 1). The students had 
e.g. the chance to reply that a steady increase in profits made them ahistorical, 
see historical relativism (alternative a). They could also choose among the three 
forms of overconfidence – loss of judgment ability, haughtiness and suppression 
of personal doubts (alternative b, c and d). Furthermore the students could 
proclaim that they were influenced by the optimism flourishing among firms in an 
economy with increasing profits (alternative e). This social psychological 
mechanism is not associated with the TTP theory.  
 
6.3 Question 3 5 
The following questions focused on the students’ strategy choices in a period of 
increasing profits. The students were first asked whether a profit boost would 
induce them to choose a status quo strategy without transformation, a status 
quo strategy with transformation or a radical transformation (see Question 3, 
alternative a, b and c)). The TTP was confirmed if the majority of the students 
preferred one of the status quo alternatives and the Schumpeterian view if they 
chose radical transformation.  
   38 
The subsequent question (Question 4) was only addressed to students who had 
declared that they would follow a status quo strategy in times of increasing 
profits in the short run. Playing the role of managers the students were asked to 
describe the motifs and mental states underlying their choice of a status quo 
option. Four of the five alternatives were meant to represent the psychological 
explanations of the TTP – increasing profits will reinforce historical relativism or 
lead to overconfidence through intoxication, haughtiness and suppression of 
doubts (alternative a, b, c and d). The fifth alternative was compatible with a 
theory of enforced rationality – the increase in profits induced firm agents to 
abandon a state of underconfidence developed during an earlier period of falling 
profits (alternative e). The TTP theory does not exclude the working of a similar 
psychological mechanism in periods of increasing profits. But the theory assumes 
that it will be superseded by the tendency to overconfidence provided that the 
profit increase continues over several years.  
 
The students were also asked about their strategy choices in a situation where 
short run profits approached record levels (see Question 5). The answer 
alternatives were the same as in the case of a profit increase in general (see 
alternative a, b and c). A special case of the TTP maintains that firms’ reluctance 
to transformation is particularly strong if profit soars to record levels. Therefore, 
students who chose radical transformation during a period with increasing profits 
in general (see Question 3) were expected to make no transformation at all or a   39 
status quo oriented transformation during a profit boom. And students who 
chose a status quo oriented transformation during a period of rising profits in 
general (see Question 3 again) were supposed to choose no transformation at all 
during a profit boom.  
 
6.4 Question 6 9 
The remaining questions concerned the strategy decisions by firms when the 
period of increasing actual profits had come to an end. The students were first 
asked about their reaction to news that their firm was facing a risk of a 
substantial decline in profits in the future (Question 6). The students could 
switch from a status quo strategy without transformation to a status quo 
strategy with transformation (alternative a) or from any of these status quo 
options to a radical transformation (alternative b). They had also a third 
alternative – they could postpone a strategy change until the firm really 
experienced an actual decline in profits (alternative c). The last alternative 
conforms to the TTP. 
 
The next question (Question 7) should only be answered by students who had 
declared that they would not change strategy until the firm experienced an 
actual decline in profits. The students had the opportunity to answer that a 
decline in actual profits was necessary to persuade them to abandon their 
(heuristic) propensity to only consider current outcomes, see historical relativism   40 
and the peak end rule (alternative d). They had also the chance to reply that the 
actual decline in profits made them less overconfident in terms of intoxication, 
haughtiness or repression (alternative b, c and e). Alternatively the students 
could unveil a propensity to overreact to an actual decline in profits (alternative 
f).  
 
The choice of any of these alternatives of enforced rational behavior and 
overreaction to an actual reduction in profits was compatible with the TTP. But 
the students had also the opportunity to choose an alternative in line with the 
option theory of investment under risk (alternative a). The ‘rational’ student 
could answer that he or she postponed transformation until the profit decline 
was real in order to increase the weight of evidence; observations of real 
outcomes would increase knowledge about the true character and scope of 
external threats. 
 
The students were also asked about their strategy response as managers to a 
decline in actual profits in one year after a period with an increase in profits (see 
Question 8). The ambition behind this formulation of the question was to make 
clear that the firms are hit by a negative external shock. Thus, all students 
should answer the question whatever their reply to the previous question on 
their reaction to information that that there is a risk of a substantial decline in 
profits in the future (see Question 6). As usual, the students could choose   41 
between a status quo strategy, with or without transformation, and a radical 
transformation. The TTP was verified if the majority of students reacted to the 
sudden decline in profits by choosing a transformation option. However, to fully 
confirm the TTP, the students must prefer a status quo oriented transformation 
or a radical transformation if they had chosen a pure status quo strategy during 
the previous period with a profit increase. And they must give priority to radical 
transformation if they had opted for a status quo shaped transformation during 
the preceding profit recovery (see Question 3). 
 
The Schumpeterian theory was confirmed if the majority of students reacted to 
the actual reduction in profits by choosing one of the status quo options. But a 
necessary condition for the validity of the Schumpeterian theory is that the 
students must shift from radical transformation in the profit recovery (see 
Question 3) to a status quo option after the profit fall. 
 
The final question (Question 9) was only posed to students who chose a 
transformation alternative after a sudden decline in profits. The students were 
asked to specify whether the profit decline must be of equal size as the previous 
increase in profits during a period of the same length (here one year) or if it 
could be small in relation to the previous increase in profits (alternative a and b). 
The aim of this question was to test the hypothesis in the special version of the 
TTP that firms that only chose a status quo option in a profit boom are less   42 
confident in this alternative. These students were supposed to change strategy 
already after a modest decline in actual profits. More precisely, 
students/managers who chose a status quo strategy without transformation 
during a profit boom but not during a ‘normal’ profit increase (see Question 3 
and 5) must change to a radical or status quo oriented strategy already after a 
small decline profits. And students/managers who chose a status quo oriented 
transformation instead of a radical transformation during a profit boom but not 
during a ‘normal’ profit increase (se Question 3 and 5 again) must react by 
changing to radical transformation already after a modest decline in profits.  
 
Another object of the last question was to find out whether the students reacted 
slowly to a profit decline because of exceptional overconfidence in status quo.  A 
possibility in the special version of the TTP is that firms choosing a status quo 
strategy with or without transformation in a profit boom and also during the 
period of a ‘normal’ profit increase (see Question 3 and 5) will only transform 
after a substantial decrease in profits. More precisely, firms that chose a status 
quo strategy without transformation during a profit boom and also during a 
period of a ‘normal’ profit increase will only decide to follow a transformation 
strategy (possibly radical) after a substantial decrease in profits. And firms that 
chose a status quo strategy with transformation during a profit boom and also 
during the period of a ‘normal’ profit increase (see Question 3 and 5 again) will 
only radically transform after a substantial reduction in profits.   43 
 
6.5 The test of inconsistency 
A central idea in the TTP is that firm agents who are generally governed by 
heuristic rules and strong emotions will first become (more) rational after an 
actual decline in profits. From the opposite viewpoint agents are rational all the 
time; a postponement of transformation until the day of an actual reduction in 
profits is explained here without any references to a new mental state or 
behavioral rule. But the answer to one question indicating a consistent rational 
behavior by the students may be contradicted by their answers to another 
question. We tested a hypothesis about inconsistent rational behavior by 
comparing the answers by each student. Our ambition was to find out whether 
we can answer in the affirmative to the following six questions: 
 
1.  Did the student declare that they have chosen a status quo strategy in a 
profit recovery on rational grounds (Question 4, alternative e) despite the 
fact that they had made investments on the basis of a small number of 
observations in a recovery (Question 1, alternative a)? 
 
2.  Did the students refer to irrational motifs for their choice of a status quo 
strategy in a profit recovery (Question 4, alternative a, b, c or d) despite 
the fact that they had made investments on rational grounds in a recovery 
(Question 1, alternative e, f or g)? 
 
3.  Did the students declare that they transformed the firm first after an 
actual decline in profits on consistently rational grounds (Question 7, 
alternative a) despite the fact that they had referred to irrational driving   44 
forces behind their decision not to transform the firm in the recovery 
(Question 4, alternative a, b, c or d)? 
 
4.   Did the students reply that they had transformed the firm first after an 
actual decline in profits on consistently rational grounds (Question 7, 
alternative a) despite the fact that that they had made investments on the 
basis of a small number of observations in a recovery (Question 1, 
alternative a)? 
 
5.  Did the students’ propensity to transform the firm first after an actual 
decline in profits reflect that they had become more rational (Question 7, 
alternative b, c, d or e) despite the fact that they have chosen a status 
quo strategy in a profit recovery on rational grounds (Question 4, 
alternative e)? 
 
6.  Did the students’ propensity to transform the firm first after an actual 
decline in profits reflect that they had become more rational (Question 7, 
alternative b, c, d or e) despite the fact that they had invested on rational 
grounds in a recovery (Question 1, alternative e, f or g)? 
 
Hence, our test of inconsistency focused on two issues. First, we analyzed 
whether the students made rational decisions on investments but referred to 
irrational motifs for their strategy choices in a recovery. Second, we checked 
whether the students had declared that they acted as consistent rational agents 
when deciding not to transform the firm until an actual decline in profits but 
made irrational choices and referred to irrational motifs for their behavior in the   45 
previous recovery. The results from the test of inconsistency are presented in a 




The results from the role play on investments are not fully conclusive, but they 
confirm to a great extent the TTP and Schumpeterian hypothesis that firms will 
overreact to a short run increase in profits (see Question 1). 27 per cent of the 
students answered that the profit increase, by having a positive effect on 
expectations, would increase their investments. This proportion was significant 
on 1 % significance level. With seven alternatives, the probability of choosing the 
‘overinvestment’ hypothesis by chance was 14 per cent (1/7) given 
independence between the alternatives.  In fact, the frequency of this answer 
was higher than for all other answers. The significance and strength of the 
overinvestment alternative is noteworthy considering that the students had the 
opportunity to choose text book alternatives including the rational ones. If the 
rational alternatives of forward looking expectations, rational adoption and 
investment under waiting are lumped together the overinvestment alternative is 
not significant at 5 % level. But the frequency of these rational answers is not 
harmful for the overinvestment hypothesis per se. Overinvestment is a possible 
reinforcing phenomenon allowing the dominance of rational responses to a short 
                                                 
16 Complete information about the dataset and the statistical tests can be attained from the 
authors.    46 
run increase in profits. Besides, the overinvestment alternative had a p value 
that was only marginally higher than the critical value of 10 %.  
 
The students who had chosen the overinvestment option should then describe 
the underlying psychological mechanism (see Question 2). A contention that the 
profit increase made them ahistorical was the most common answer (1/3) 
without being significant. However the proportion of students who had selected 
any of the psychological mechanisms in the TTP (16 of 22 students) was 
significant at 10 % level (given the expected proportion of 50 %).  Thus, the 
share for the psychological alternative not associated with the TTP – higher 
short run profits will create euphoric feelings in the economy – was insignificant.  
 
The students supported the TTP by demonstrating a strong propensity to choose 
a status quo option in periods of a rise in profits (Question 3). The total share for 
the status quo options – 86 per cent (73 out of 85 students) – is significant at 1 
% level. The Schumpeterian choice of radical transformation was not frequent 
enough to be significant.
17 On the other hand, more students opted for radical 
transformation than for a status quo position without transformation (12 and 8 
students respectively). The weak preferences for a pure status quo strategy are 
certainly unfavorable, though not a blow, to the TTP. 
 
                                                 
17 However the Schumpeterian hypothesis is more difficult to verify than the TTP hypothesis 
allowing people to choose between two alternatives.    47 
A relatively low number of those students who chose a status quo strategy in 
times of increasing profits declared that they had been governed by the 
psychological mechanism emphasized in the TTP (Question 4). The proportion of 
these answers was not even significant after rejecting the assumption of 
independence between the alternatives. In this case, the frequencies of 
overconfidence, haughtiness and repression were added (resulting in an 
expected value of 50 per cent) and then compared to the frequency of the only 
remaining alternative – the increase in profits induced the students to switch 
from underconfidence to rationality.  
 
The role play did not confirm a specific version of TTP emphasizing that firms are 
exceptionally status quo minded in a profit boom. The proportions of students 
choosing a status quo option was not significantly higher if their firms were 
experiencing record levels of profits instead of a profit increase in general (see 
Question 5). Neither did the role play confirm that students who have opted for 
radical transformation in a period with a profit increase in general (see Question 
3) chose one of the status quo options in a profit boom. In fact the number of 
students who switched to a status quo option in the profit boom (7 students) 
was only marginally higher than the number of students who continued with 
radical transformation (5 students); the difference was not significant. 
Furthermore, a minor share of the students (2 of 65 students) changed from a   48 
status quo option with transformation to a pure status quo alternative when 
profits approached record levels (the proportion was far from significant.) 
 
The majority of students declared that they would react to information about a 
substantial decrease in profits in the future by changing to either a status quo 
oriented or radical transformation (Question 6). 30 % of the students chose the 
alternative representing the TTP – firms will not react until the profit decline is 
manifest. This share is significantly less than the expected 50 %. Thus the role 
play was unable to confirm the TTP theory that firms will first react by 
transformation after an actual decline in profits. But the risk for a rational bias is 
obvious in this case. The small number of alternatives made it easy to distinguish 
the ‘correct’ answers. Furthermore, the number of students who behaved in line 
with the TTP (26 students) was approximately equal to the number of students 
who answered that they would react to expected threats in the future by 
switching from a status quo strategy without transformation to one with 
transformation (25 students). 
 
The psychological explanations for why firms will only react to an actual decline 
in profits were not confirmed by our role play (see Question 7). 4 of the 26 
students who had declared that they would first react to an actual reduction in 
profits chose one of the psychological alternatives (see Question 6). 22 students 
answered in line with the option theory of investment under risk that they first   49 
reacted when the profit fall was real to get a clearer picture of the character and 
scope of the decline. The difference between these ‘rational’ answers and the 
other answers was significant.
18  
 
The role play confirmed that firms will choose transformation in a period of an 
actual decline in profits (Question 8). In fact 77 of the 85 students preferred one 
of the transformation alternatives. This result is significant assuming that the real 
alternatives were transformation or not transformation. It is also significant with 
the assumption that the transformation alternatives were randomly distributed 
(implying an expected probability of 2/3). The fact that only 24 students chose 
radical transformation after an actual decline in profits does not reject the TTP. 
But the arguments for the TTP would definitely have been stronger with a higher 
share for this radical alternative.  
 
The role play supported the hypothesis in the TTP that firms that had chosen a 
pure status quo strategy during the period of a profit increase would transform 
when they then faced a decrease in profits. A significant proportion (88 %) of 
the students who had preferred this status quo alternative in the profit recovery 
decided to pursue a transformation. (The expected proportion was 50 %.) Fair to 
say, however, the number of students who had chosen a status quo position 
without any transformation during the profit recovery was small (8 students). 
                                                 
18 The proportion of ‘rational´students was statistically significant at 1 % level with an expected 
proportion of 50 % by chance.   50 
Moreover, the role play did not endorse the pertinent hypothesis in the TTP that 
firms that had chosen a status quo oriented growth strategy during the upswing 
in profits turned to a radical transformation in the subsequent period of falling 
profits. Only 16 out of 65 students made this change of strategy. We conclude, 
though with reservations, that the role play has confirmed the hypothesis in the 
TTP that firms will switch to a transformation strategy when profits are actually 
falling.  
 
The Schumpeterian theory requiring that a majority of the students should meet 
a profit decline by opting for a status quo alternative was confirmed by the role 
play. The popularity of a status quo oriented transformation explains why both 
the TTP and the Schumpeterian theory were confirmed in this case of a profit 
decline. However the role play did not confirm the Schumpeterian hypothesis 
that firms switched from radical transformation to a status quo option when the 
period of increasing profits was replaced by a period with falling profits. 7 of 12 
students who had opted for radical transformation in the profit recovery did 
change strategy. This share was not significant with an expected share of 50 % 
(the p value was 0.77).  
 
The hypothesis in the specified TTP that firms will react even to a minor decline 
by transformation if they had first switched to a status quo alternative in a profit 
boom was hardly confirmed (Question 9). An insignificant proportion of students   51 
who had only opted for a pure status quo alternative in a profit boom declared 
that they would respond even to a small decrease in profits by transformation 
(see also Question 3 and 5). On the other hand, a significant proportion of 
students who had only chosen a status quo oriented transformation (instead of a 
radical transformation) in a profit boom answered that they would react to even 
a small reduction in profits by radical transformation (4 of 5 students). But it is 
difficult to draw any real conclusions in this case due to the low number of 
students who had changed strategy in the profit recovery. By also taking account 
of the students’ weak propensity to be more status quo oriented in a profit boom 
(than during a ‘normal’ increase in profits) the role play has provided weak 
arguments for the specific TTP.  
 
The role play was unable to clearly display that a strong decrease in profits was 
needed to enforce firms that chose a status quo strategy both during a profit 
increase in general and during a profit boom to transform (Question 9). The 
majority of the students who preferred a pure status quo strategy in both cases 
of an upswing in profits needed a substantial decrease in profits to transform 
(see also Question 3 and 5). But the number of students who chose a pure 
status quo strategy during both a ‘normal’ profit increase and a profit boom was 
very small (5 students). Furthermore a minority of the students who chose a 
status quo oriented transformation in both recovery cases answered that they 
would only make a radical transformation after a substantial decrease in profits   52 
(25 of 52 students). However the difficulties to unambiguously confirm the 
hypothesis that a substantial decline in profits is required to overcome too strong 
confidence in status quo are not critical for the TTP. The hypothesis is not a 
necessary condition for the validity of the theory.  
 
Let us finally present the results from the test of inconsistency. The students 
obviously made an inconsistent choice in one of the six cases, case 4. Eight of 
the nine students who had had made investments on the basis of a small 
number of observations in a recovery and then reacted first on an actual decline 
in profits declared that their late reaction reflected a wish to attain more 
information about external challenges (see Question 7, alternative a). This 
proportion was statistically significant on 1 % level even with the assumption of 
independent alternatives (thus with the expected proportion of 50 %). There are 
also indications of an inconsistent behavior in case 2. 12 of the 39 students who 
had admitted that they were under the influence of one of the irrational 
(psychological) forces in the TTP when choosing strategy in a recession 
simultaneously declared that their investments were governed by rational 
considerations. This share was significant on 5 % level given an expected share 
of 50 %. But there were no indications of inconsistent behavior in four of the six 
cases, especially not in case 5 and 6.  
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Thus, our study provides weak support to a hypothesis that the students who 
expressed a consistent rational attitude when answering one question 
contradicted themselves when answering other questions. The lack of strong 
evidence of inconsistent behavior in four of the six cases is striking. However, 
the low number of students in many cases (mostly less than ten) prevents more 
definite conclusions about the degree of consistency in our role play. 
 
8. Conclusions and comments 
Today psychological concepts are common in financial economics but not in the 
analysis of the business cycle and economic growth. This paper has focused on 
firm behavior and the underlying psychological mechanisms in the theory of 
transformation pressure (TTP). By emphasizing the pivotal role of negative 
driving forces the theory suggests that productivity growth within firms is 
obstructed by increasing actual profits and accordingly moves countercyclically. 
This view of the relationship between profits and productivity has 
correspondences in the literature on bounded rationality. But the psychological 
approach of the TTP makes it possible to formulate and anchor a hypothesis that 
firms’ decision on productivity is based on current profits. People’s priority to 
current outcomes is emphasized in the (economic) psychological literature about 
heuristic decision making, see the peak end rule and historical relativism. The 
TTP also maintains that increasing profits make firm agents overconfident. 
Furthermore, in the TTP, a current increase in profits would induce firm agents   54 
to opt for a status quo oriented growth strategy. The psychological literature 
underlines that people have a status quo bias, e.g., by following the heuristic 
principle of habits. When arguing for the hypothesis that more rational firms will 
escape a status quo oriented strategy in periods of falling profits, the TTP refers 
to the abandoning of overconfidence and heuristic decision making. Finally, the 
theory uses psychological concepts to explain why firms might either overreact 
or underreact to a profit decline.  
 
In Schumpeterian economics, positive driving forces are decisive for innovation 
and productivity growth. The Schumpeterian tradition sheds light on the 
importance of technological and financial opportunities and learning (in both 
production and R&D activities) for innovations. But it also refers to the positive 
effects of overoptimism and excessive risk taking on R&D investments in a 
recovery. Strong transformation pressure can actually interrupt those virtuous 
growth circles that are highlighted by Schumpeterian economists. But it may also 
prevent that a path depending cumulative process leads to industrial locking in 
effects.  
 
A class of undergraduate students in economics at Stockholm University 
participated in a role play where they were asked to act as managers for an 
established company. The role play aimed at testing the hypotheses about 
investments, growth strategies and underlying psychological mechanisms in the   55 
TTP. The questionnaire also provided room for answers in accordance with 
Schumpeterian economics and the neoclassical theory of rational behavior. 
 
The role play supported the hypothesis in the TTP, and also in Schumpeterian 
economics, about overinvestment in periods of increasing profits. The 
participants emphasized that they were governed by ahistorical thinking. The 
role play also confirmed the hypotheses in the TTP that firms have a preference 
for status quo in a profit recovery and, although not consistently, for 
transformation after a negative profit shock. The experiment did not verify the 
Schumpeterian hypotheses that firms would choose a radical transformation in 
periods of increasing profits and then switch to a status quo option when profits 
fell. However, most students preferred a rational investment option when profits 
were increasing. The TTP is not contradicted by this result, but by the fact that 
the significance of the overinvestment answers was ambiguous. Neither could 
the role play clearly confirm the specific TTP in which the strategy choices in a 
profit boom are exceptional and also decisive for the strategy choices after an 
actual profit fall. Furthermore, according to their own assessment, the students 
were mainly governed by rational concerns in their investment and strategy 
decisions. The bulk of the students replied that the preference for status quo in a 
profit recovery reflected that they had become more rational, not that they were 
governed by the psychological anomalies of the TTP. Most students also reported 
that they would have transformed the firm already after an expected reduction in   56 
profits and almost all of the remaining students proclaimed that they first reacted 
to an actual decline to get more information. We have to accept that the role 
play was unable to verify the TTP idea that the degree of rational behavior in 
firms depends on current external circumstances. Moreover, in only one of six 
cases was a consistently rational answer to one question clearly contradicted by 
an irrational answer to another question.  
 
Our study underpins the view that economics shall not throw the baby out with 
the bath water by abandoning the assumption of rational behavior. But at the 
same time the study confirms that “…the deviations of actual behaviour from the 
normative model are too widespread to be ignored…” (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986, pp. 252). We must also remind the reader that the conducted role play 
probably had a rational bias. 
 
An obvious objection to our role play is that undergraduate students have neither 
the ability nor the incentives to enter into the role of managers for an established 
company. Instead the answers by the students to the questionnaire might have 
been shaped, notwithstanding the instructions, by their knowledge about 
macroeconomics and conjectures about the expectations of the experimentalists. 
On the other hand it is not certain that students would provide a less accurate 
picture of investments and strategy choices than real firm agents completing a 
similar questionnaire. Prestigious managers are probably unwilling, even   57 
anonymously, to reveal their true motifs and less able to make a psychological 
self diagnosis than students only pretending to be managers. Furthermore the 
students may experience a role play as more authentic than lab experiments, 
even if these experiments would involve pecuniary incentives.  
 
The main limitation of our role game is that it cannot reproduce those industry 
structural conditions, human capabilities and conventional beliefs among leading 
groups that constitute the framework for decision making in the business sector. 
These structural and institutional factors make it reasonable to expect that firms’ 
reaction to external shocks is industry , country  and time specific. Furthermore, 
the psychological literature does not unanimously support the TTP (Erixon, 2007, 
pp. 339 342). In fact, a qualified TTP refers to psychological mechanisms and 
industrial characteristics providing room for a positive relationship between 
profits and productivity growth (ibid., pp. 342 344). 
 
Our role play was based on the idea that the reaction by firms to variations in 
external circumstances in a developed market economy is influenced by some 
fundamental biological processes and social conventions. We conclude that the 
completed role play has actually shed light on these basic human instincts and 
market conforming conventions and also confirmed, though not unambiguously, 
the conception of firm strategies and psychologies in the theory of 
transformation pressure.   58 
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A role play – acting as managers for an established (old) company (translation from Swedish)  
 
Starting point: 
Assume that you are a manager for a company that had existed for at least 20 years. You shall 
now make endeavors to imagine how you would have reacted to changes in the rate of return on 
equity (“profits”). Note that you shall choose the answer alternative that describes how you 
believe that you would have reacted in a real situation. You shall only choose the alternative 
which seems to be the best one for you and the company – the most rational – if you are really 
convinced that you would have chosen that alternative in a real situation. Use your ability to 
enter into the mind of a manager! 
 
Neither shall you choose the answer alternative that you believe that the experimentalists would 
have expected. Use your ability to enter into other people’s mind but not by the ambition to 
identify the answers that you think that the experimentalists would want! 
 
Answer the questions in turn. When answering a new question you have no opportunities to 
correct the answers on earlier questions. 
 
You shall only choose one answer on each question. Please encircle your answer. 
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Question 1 
 
Your company has experienced increasing profits during this year and the previous two three 
years. (Profits are presented annually.) It is not excluded that other firms, for example your 
competitors, are also favored by a similar increase in profits. Which decision on investments will 
you make in this situation and which are your arguments for this decision? The decision is not 
about the character of the investments. Investments can be made in machinery, buildings, new 
organizations or in R&D. 
 
The following assumption is made in all questions 1 9: 
 
   The company has the opportunity to borrow cheaply to finance investments, thus the 
company has no problem of financing the investment. 
 
a) I will increase investments since the profit increase in the firm has a positive effect on my 
expectations of profits in the future. 
 
b) I will increase investments since the profit increase in my company is a signal that the 
company will suffer from capacity limitations in the future. 
 
c) I will increase investments fearing that the competitors will react to an actual increase in 
profits by investments. 
 
d) I will increase investments since investments by other companies will increase the demand for 
the products/services of my company. 
 
e) I will not necessarily increase investments since my expectations about profits in the future 
are based on profits over a longer historical period, thus not only on profits this year and the 
previous years. 
 
f) I will not necessarily increase investments since investments are only determined by expected 
events in the future, not by profits this year or by earlier profits. 
 
g) I will postpone investments to get a clearer idea of to what extent the profit increase for the 
company is steady (and not temporary). The postponement makes it possible to make more 












You shall only answer this question if you have answered a) on question 1. 
 
Try to describe the psychological mechanism explaining that your investment 




a) Increasing profits for the company this year and the previous years induced 
me to ignore or give low weight to the earlier profit development. The actual 
profit development of the company made me ahistorical (myopic). 
 
b) Increasing optimism about the future through the firm’s increase in profits 
made me undiscerning. With other words, the actual profit development of the 
firm made me intoxicated. 
 
c) Through the high profits I got an exaggerated belief in my and the company’s 
ability to e.g. meet threats in the future. The actual profit development of the 
firm made me haughty. 
‘ 
d) Through the high profits I repressed the risks of an investment – I acted self 
deceptively. 
 
e) I was carried away by the optimistic atmosphere in an economy characterized 
by a general increase in profits. My investment propensity expressed a general 













Assume as above that your firm has experienced an increase in profits this year 




a) I will not take any efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize and I will 
maintain the existing product composition, technology and organization since it 
appeared to be profitable – a status quo strategy without transformation. 
 
b) To meet future threats I take efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize but 
I will not pursue a radical change in product composition, technology or 
organizations – a status quo strategy with transformation. 
 
c) Increasing optimism and longer time perspectives because of the profit boost 
induced me to make a radical change in product composition, technology or 
















You shall only answer this question if you have answered a) or b) on question 3. 
 
Try to describe your motifs for or the psychological mechanism behind your 
decision not to transform the company at all or only pursue a status quo oriented 
transformation when your company experienced increasing profits during this 
year and the previous two three years. 
 
a) The increase in profits made me ignore that the firm must have pursued 
status quo oriented transformation or even radical transformation during earlier 
periods. 
 
b) The higher optimism about the future through the company’s increase in 
profits induced me to make an undiscerning choice of a firm strategy without any 
transformation at all or a strategy with a status quo oriented transformation. 
 
 c) Through the high profits I got an exaggerated belief in my ability and the 
company’s ability to meet threats in the future which made me believe that there 
were real arguments for a firm strategy without radical transformation or without 
any transformation at all in the current situation. 
 
d) Through the high profits I repressed the risks of a status quo strategy without 
transformation or of a status quo strategy with transformation. 
 
e) The increase in profits made me realize that there are unique competencies in 
the firm explaining that a status quo strategy (with or without transformation) 




A status quo strategy without transformation: 
I will not take any efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize and I will maintain the existing 
product composition, technology and organization. 
 
A status quo strategy with transformation: 
I take efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize but I will not pursue a radical change in 
product composition, technology or organizations. 
 
A radical transformation: 
I pursue a radical change in product composition, technology or organizations. 
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Question 5 
 
Which firm strategy would you choose if the increase in profits this year and the 
previous two three years was so strong that your company came to experience 
record high profits in a historical perspective? 
 
 
a) I will choose a status quo strategy without transformation. 
 
b) I will choose a status quo strategy with transformation. 
 





A status quo strategy without transformation: 
I will not take any efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize and I will maintain the existing 
product composition, technology and organization. 
 
A status quo strategy with transformation: 
I take efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize but I will not pursue a radical change in 
product composition, technology or organizations. 
 
A radical transformation: 
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Question 6 
 
How would you react to new information that your company faced the risk of a 
substantial decline in profits in the future? Note that the company has 
experienced three four years with increasing profits. 
 
a) I will switch from a status quo strategy without transformation to a status quo 
strategy with transformation. 
 
b) I will switch to a radical transformation. 
 
c) I will not change from a status quo strategy without transformation to a 
status quo strategy with transformation or pursue a radical transformation until 






A status quo strategy without transformation: 
I will not take any efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize and I will maintain the existing 
product composition, technology and organization. 
 
A status quo strategy with transformation: 
I take efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize but I will not pursue a radical change in 
product composition, technology or organizations. 
 
A radical transformation: 
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Question 7 
 
You shall only answer this question if you have answered c) on question 6. 
 
Why will you first change to a status quo strategy with transformation or pursue 
a radical transformation when the decline in profits is actual? 
 
a) I postpone a reaction to get a clearer picture of the real character and scope 
of the profit decline, for example, of to what extent the decline reflected external 
threats or internal firm conditions. 
 
b) I need an actual decline in profits to abandon my too optimistic view of the 
firm’s prospect and to sober down after the period of increasing profits. 
 
c) I need an actual decline in profits to abandon the false feeling of 
invulnerability and superiority during the preceding period of increasing profits. 
 
d) I need an actual profit decline to abandon my myopia during the previous 
period of increasing profits and focus on the profit development during a longer 
historical period. 
 
e) I need an actual decline in profits to abandon my tendency during the period 
of increasing profits to repress the risks of a status quo strategy without 
transformation or a status quo strategy with transformation. 
 
f)  I have a tendency to overreact to actual reductions in profits (though not 








A status quo strategy without transformation: 
I will not take any efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize and I will maintain the existing 
product composition, technology and organization. 
 
A status quo strategy with transformation: 
I take efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize but I will not pursue a radical change in 
product composition, technology or organizations. 
 
A radical transformation: 
I pursue a radical change in product composition, technology or organizations. 
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Question 8 
 
Which strategy will you choose if your company experienced an actual decline in 
profits during a year after three four years of actual increases in profits? 
 
a) A status quo strategy without transformation. 
 
b) A status quo strategy with transformation. 
 






A status quo strategy without transformation: 
I will not take any efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize and I will maintain the existing 
product composition, technology and organization. 
 
A status quo strategy with transformation: 
I take efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize but I will not pursue a radical change in 
product composition, technology or organizations. 
 
A radical transformation: 













You shall only answer this question if you answered b) or c) on question 8. 
 
Did your decision to transform the company depend on the size of the actual 
decline in profits during the year? 
 
 
a) Yes – the profit decline must at least be similar to the profit increase in the 
previous year to persuade me to transform the company. 
 
b) No – even a small decline in profits compared to the profit increase in the 






A status quo strategy without transformation: 
I will not take any efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize and I will maintain the existing 
product composition, technology and organization. 
 
A status quo strategy with transformation: 
I take efficiency enhancing measures or rationalize but I will not pursue a radical change in 
product composition, technology or organizations. 
 
A radical transformation: 
I pursue a radical change in product composition, technology or organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 